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1.   The Question: Can Virtue Be Measured? 
 
The question before us – indeed, the framing question of this conference – is “can virtue 
be measured”? It strikes me that this question could be a question about (at least) two things – 
first, whether any of the existing empirical research claiming to measure the presence (or 
absence) of virtue should be taken seriously (and if so, which parts); second, whether the first 
question is a reasonable question to ask not just because there is worry about the empirical 
methods employed thus far, but because the very idea of measuring something like virtue is 
implausible on the face of it. In other words, the question framing this conference is a question 
about whether virtue is the sort of thing that is scientifically “untouchable”, either due to the 
existence of practical barriers (not enough time, funding, resources; inadequate technology) or in 
principle. 
I take it that most (if not all) of us present are disinclined towards the latter view. I myself 
see no reason to think that virtue is sort of thing that science cannot, at least in principle, touch – 
but I also think that the work done thus far has only begun to scratch the surface (and some of it, 
the wrong surface). That is to say, while I am inclined to think that virtue is the sort of thing 
empirical science can measure, any endeavor to do so – if done properly – will require a 
tremendous amount of time, energy, resources, and creativity and will only bear fruit through the 
convergence of different methodological strategies employed in different (but overlapping) 
ways. 
 
With this in mind, I’d like to discuss some ideas – born out of a tremendously productive 
and enjoyable collaboration with Nancy Snow – about how a robust empirical program studying 
virtue could be built. As such, I will be focusing here on two things: 1) offering for your 
consideration a working “operational definition” of virtue(s), and 2) providing ideas about 
different empirical strategies for measuring it, borrowing from the approaches being developed 
to study other related (at least insofar as they share a common set of challenges) constructs, such 
as personality.
2.   A Working Definition Of Virtue(s) 
 
Step 1: Distinguishing between virtue intelligence and full-blown virtue 
 
In her keynote address, Nancy Snow introduced the notion of “virtue intelligence.” Virtue 
intelligence, as we’ve come to think about it, is more or less shorthand for identifying the inner 
mental states of the virtuous agent, as understood in Aristotelian terms.  Similar to constructs 
such as social intelligence and emotional intelligence, it identifies the perceptual processes, 
motivational states, cognitions, affective responses and other mechanisms that interact to lead to 
virtuous action. 
Virtue intelligence involves, at a minimum, the presence of (some set of) virtues, such as 
honesty, bravery, kindness, and generosity. (It remains an open question how many of – and 
which – virtues would have to be present in order for a person to possess virtue intelligence.) 
It is important to note that while crucial, by itself virtue intelligence is not (yet) full-blown virtue. 
After all, it seems right to hold that people can have virtue intelligence without having the 
consciously acknowledged goal to develop and maintain their virtues – they can, for example, be 
courageous or generous without consciously wanting to be so or deliberately seeking to cultivate 
and sustain these virtues. 
We would not want to deny that such people are virtuous in some sense – insofar as they 
possess certain virtues, they possess “virtue intelligence” (of some degree). However, at the same 
time, we would not want to say that they possess full-blown virtue. Full-blown virtue, we would 
argue, is a form of properly motivated virtue intelligence – i.e., virtue intelligence that has 
become linked with the right sort of motivational structure, such as a long-standing and 
consciously acknowledged commitment to the development and maintenance of virtue(s). People 
possessing full-blown virtue act in virtue-relevant ways not only when, but because such actions 
are called for – they are motivated to do the right things for the right reasons. 
An initial categorization of the distinction between virtue intelligence and full-blown 
virtue, then, is based on the conscious adoption, or lack thereof, of the goal of developing and 
maintaining virtue(s). 
 
Step 2: Operational definition of virtue(s) 
 
Walter Mischel and Yuichi Shoda (two social-cognitive psychologists) proposed a theory 
of personality called the “cognitive-affective personality system” (CAPS), which includes a 
conception of a “trait” that meshes well with the Aristotelian conception of virtue (see e.g.,
Mischel 1973; Mischel and Shoda 1995). Snow has argued elsewhere (2010) that virtues, 
including Aristotelian virtues, function like (and, indeed, are a subset of) CAPS traits. 
Following this work, we have operationalized virtues as “traits” – which, as such, are 
composed of a set of: 
(a) trait-appropriate cognitive/affective/behavioral responses that are 
 
(b) consistently triggered by 
 
(c) trait-relevant stimuli in the person’s 
 
(d) environment. 
 
So, let’s unpack this. 
 
Regarding (a): We consider traits to be a set of linked, trait-appropriate 
“cognitive/affective/ behavioral” responses because trait activation typically involves a variety of 
trait-appropriate cognitive states (e.g., beliefs, desires, goals, values, etc.), and affective states 
(e.g., emotions, moods, etc.) and corresponding behavioral responses. In other words, trait 
activation produces a cascade of corresponding trait-appropriate responses – “inner” mental 
states, emotional reactions, and “outer” behaviors. (This is not to say that the cognitive/ affective 
and the behavioral responses don’t come apart – they can and do.  In order for someone to be 
said to fully possess a trait, however, they need typically to be linked so that they co-occur.) 
Regarding (b): When we say that a trait’s cognitive/affective/behavioral responses are 
“consistently” triggered by trait-relevant stimuli, we mean at the very least that they are typically 
triggered – that is, activated more often than not.  Ultimately, however, the cultivation (and/or 
socialization) of virtue traits will result in these responses becoming habitually activated.  For 
any trait-relevant response to become habitual, it must be triggered repeatedly, becoming 
chronically accessible; it must be automatic, that is, not require conscious deliberation or 
processing for activation; and, at least in the case of full-blown virtue, it must be aligned in the 
right sort of way with the person’s values/goals – something a person does and endorses. 
Regarding (c): When we say that “trait-relevant stimuli” activate cognitive/affective/ 
behavioral responses, we are referring to stimuli in two senses – that is, we are referring to both 
the objective features of the situation to which a person is responding (features that “call for” a 
trait-appropriate response, such as, in the case of virtue, seeing a person slumped over and 
moaning – a person in apparent need – as requiring a compassionate, helpful response), but also, 
and just as importantly, the subjective interpretation that a person gives to those objective
features. Thus, the person herself must “see the situation as” being trait-relevant and calling for a 
trait-appropriate response. Ideally – perhaps in some cases of full-blown virtue – these two will 
overlap completely, but most of the time they will diverge. 
This means that the development of virtue traits will require both that the person be able 
to accurately assess and interpret the objective features of a situation (i.e., to know when virtue- 
relevant stimuli are present and when they are not) and be able to determine what the virtue- 
appropriate response would be. 
(Obviously, this raises an important problem for anyone measuring virtue traits, insofar 
as it assumes that that there is a right answer about which stimuli are/are not virtue-relevant, 
objectively speaking, and that we can know what the right answers are, in order to measure the 
degree of overlap. Importantly, though, this is not just a problem for the measurement of 
virtue(s) – or for virtue ethics more generally. I will get to some thoughts about how to address 
this empirically in a bit). 
Regarding (d): When we refer to a person’s “environment” we are referring to both the 
external environment (the physical/social world by which the person is surrounded and in which 
the person is immersed), and also the internal environment of the person him/herself (e.g., their 
ideas, imaginings, etc.). 
I will now use this account of virtue(s) to discuss possible methodological strategies of 
the measurement of virtue intelligence and full-blown virtue. 
 
 
3.   Measuring Virtue(s) – Part I: Virtue Intelligence 
 
According to the account given above, the measurement of “virtue intelligence” involves 
the measurement of the presence of (a set of) virtue traits, which we’ve operationalized as being 
a set of (a) virtue-appropriate cognitive/affective/behavioral responses that are (b) consistently 
triggered by (c) virtue-relevant stimuli in the person’s (d) environment. This means that to 
empirically measure the level of people’s virtue intelligence, we need to be able to measure three 
variables: 
1)  Sensitivity to the presence of virtue-relevant (external/internal) stimuli, which includes 
the accurate attribution of virtue-relevant significance to stimuli.  For example, does a 
person notice that another is in need, is upset or struggling?  If so, then they have the
opportunity to express compassion, which seems called for.  If not, the opportunity for 
compassion will be missed. 
2)  Recognition and generation of virtue-appropriate (cognitive/affective/behavioral) 
responses. Suppose an instructor notices that a student is upset, perhaps on the verge of 
tears.  Does the teacher react with appropriate gentleness and compassion?  Simply 
ignore the student?  Acknowledge the student’s distress, but react brusquely or with 
annoyance? And would the teacher recognize another’s compassionate response to the 
student’s distress as appropriate? 
3)  Consistency and habituality of the connection between the sensitivity to virtue-relevant 
stimuli and the recognition and generation of virtue-relevant responses – what we call 
“dispositionality”. For example, does a person typically have a compassionate response 
to someone else’s perceived need, or is it relatively rare? And how many different 
expressions of need does the person respond compassionately towards? 
I will go through some suggestions for measuring each of these in turn. The inspiration 
for many of the ideas presented below comes from Mehl and Conner’s (2012) Handbook of 
Research Methods for Studying Daily Life (especially Chs. 4-5, 7-15, and 29). Though the focus 
of this volume is not the study of virtue, many of the conceptual and methodological tools 
presented there apply. 
 
Step 1: Measuring sensitivity to the presence of virtue-relevant stimuli 
 
First, we can operationalize “sensitivity” in a number of ways: here, I will do so in terms 
of people’s perception (visual/auditory), identification, and/or generation of virtue-relevant 
stimuli. 
There are a variety of techniques that could be used to measure people’s perception of 
virtue-relevant stimuli. First, we could measure people’s perception of virtue-relevant stimuli in 
actual or fictional social interactions. For example, people could be asked to “hit a button” while 
watching a video or listening to an audio clip of other people’s social interactions whenever they 
observe that a virtue-relevant stimulus is present (that is, whenever a virtue-appropriate response 
would be called for). We could then have them go back through their “hits” and verbally 
describe/explain what they take the virtue-relevant stimuli to be and why (as well as what they 
think the virtue-appropriate responses would be – also helpful in addressing step 2).
Second, we could measure people’s identification of virtue-relevant stimuli in actual or 
fictional narratives (e.g., stories, short vignette-style cases, etc.) or in the abstract 
(decontextualized lists of stimuli). Two measurement methods will be useful here. First, we 
could ask people to read the narratives/vignettes, highlight the presence of virtue-relevant 
stimuli, and explain why they take them to be virtue-relevant stimuli (see Narvaez, 2001). They 
could also be asked what they think the virtue-appropriate responses would be (helpful in 
addressing step 2).  Second, we could use a method of abstraction by giving people a virtue to 
consider (for example, honesty) and then presenting them with different sets of circumstances, 
asking them to identify for which of them virtue-relevant stimuli are present – that is, for which 
circumstances virtue-appropriate response would be called for. 
Finally, we could use both narratives and abstraction to measure people’s capacity to 
spontaneously generate virtue-relevant stimuli.  For example, we can have people write 
narratives that contain virtue-relevant stimuli, and explain why they take them to be virtue- 
relevant stimuli, as well as what they think the virtue-appropriate responses would be (which 
would also provide information that addresses step 2). We could also have people consider a 
virtue, and then spontaneously generate a list of as many circumstances as they can think of in 
which a display of that virtue would be called for. 
At some point we will need to take into account the degree of overlap between people’s 
sensitivity to the objective features of the situation to which the person is responding and the 
subjective interpretation that the person gives to those objective features – what we might call 
their degree of “accuracy” (raising the problem mentioned earlier). While, this is a worry that 
simply cannot be fully deflated, I think there are several strategies we could employ to at least 
partially address it. One would be to develop a “paradigmaticity” index that would allow us to 
measure how paradigmatic particular virtue-relevant stimuli are, in terms of the speed at which 
they are perceived and/or how frequently they are generated or identified as examples. 
Participants’ responses could then be measured according to how well they track paradigmatic 
virtue-relevant stimuli. (Of course, in this regard, we might expect a curvilinear trajectory, with 
people both low and high in virtue intelligence being lower on paradigmaticity than those mid- 
range – people high in virtue intelligence are likely to be sensitive to virtue-relevant stimuli not 
commonly recognized as such.) Another important consideration (distinct from paradigmaticity)
is the extent to which people provide good reasons (even if post-hoc) for why they consider 
things to be virtue-relevant stimuli, or not. 
 
Step 2: Measuring recognition and generation of virtue-appropriate responses 
 
People’s “recognition” of virtue-appropriate responses can be operationally defined as 
their ability to identify cognitive/affective/behavior responses as being virtue-appropriate or not, 
whether we take virtue-appropriateness to be a yes/no matter, or something that admits of degree. 
There are several ways this could be measured: 
First, we could use a third-person response method, in which we give people narratives, 
short-vignettes, or even shorter, decontextualized, examples of other people’s cognitive/ 
affective/ behavior responses to virtue-relevant stimuli and ask them to identify which are virtue- 
appropriate and which not (and why). 
Second, we could use a first-person/past response method, according to which people are 
asked to recall (e.g., through daily diary entries) virtue-relevant stimuli from their past and what 
their own cognitive/affective/behavior responses were, and then asked to evaluate their responses 
as virtue-appropriate (or not) and why (for more on diary methods, see Handbook, Chs, 4, 5, and 
8).  People’s ability to identify which of their own past cognitive/affective/behavior responses 
were virtue-appropriate and which were not (and why) represents a useful measure of the 
development of virtue intelligence. 
This approach could also be expanded upon to see if people can identify how to make 
non-virtue-appropriate cognitive/affective/behavior responses virtue-appropriate, as well as how 
to encourage future cognitive/affective/ behavior responses to be virtue-appropriate (this would 
be getting into “generation”). To illustrate: we could measure 1) the extent to which a person 
both recognized that her treatment of one of her co-workers in the past was unfair, 2) was able to 
articulate how she could have responded (what alternative response would have been fair), and 
3) was able to articulate steps that she could take to insure a fair response in the future. 
 
Finally, we could use the first-person/present method, according to which people are ask 
to record their “live” cognitive/affective/ behavior responses to virtue-relevant stimuli and then 
asked to evaluate them as virtue-appropriate/not-virtue-appropriate (as well as why). This could 
be done using daily diaries and/or more timely “event-contingent response” (ECR) technologies. 
These are typically portable electronic devices that allow people to record their responses at the
moment that an event occurs – in this case, a response to virtue-relevant stimuli (for more on 
 
ECR methods, see Handbook, Chs. 4, 5, 7, and 9). 
 
People’s “generation” of virtue-appropriate responses can be operationally defined as 
their ability to articulate what the best virtue-appropriate responses would be, given the presence 
of particular virtue-relevant stimuli. Again, several methods of measurement are available: 
First, we could use a hypothetical method in which we give people narratives, vignettes, 
and/or decontextualized examples of virtue-relevant stimuli (visual images also being an option), 
and ask them to spontaneously generate either what their cognitive/ affective/behavioral 
responses would/should be or what others’ cognitive/affective/ behavior responses would/should 
be. (There is an important distinction between what people think theirs or others’ responses 
would be (actual) and what they should be (ideal).  The difference between the actual and the 
ideal responses can serve as an important measure of the degree to which people both recognize 
the appropriate response and believe they or others would be able to achieve it.) 
Second, we could use an observational/experimental approach to observe people in 
controlled circumstances in which certain virtue-relevant stimuli are present and then monitor 
their cognitive/affective/behavioral responses to those stimuli. We could then have people 
evaluate their responses as virtue-appropriate (or not). We could also have others evaluate them 
as virtue-appropriate (or not). 
Monitoring can involve a video/audio set up at location, as well as recordings, of 
physiological responses, such as heart rate, galvanic skin response, and pupil dilation. (This is 
not to suggest that we take physiological responses – e.g., increased heart rate at the sign of 
another’s distress – to, by themselves, be indicators of virtue. Nonetheless, they are an important 
part of trait-appropriate cognitive/affective/behavioral responses. For example, in a study of the 
helping behavior of young children, Hepach, Vaish, & Tomasello (2012) found that when 
children witness a person in need of help, they experience sympathetic distress, revealed by 
increased pupil dilation. This pupil dilation decreases when that person receives help, whether it 
is the child who helps the individual or a third-party, suggesting that is the person receiving help 
that eases the child’s sympathetic distress, not a more egocentric desire to be the helper.) 
Perhaps the most interesting method, though, would be to use an observational/ 
naturalistic approach, observing people in natural circumstances in which certain virtue-relevant 
stimuli are present and then monitor their cognitive/affective/behavior responses, and ask them
(later) to evaluate their responses as virtue-appropriate (or not). We could also have others 
evaluate them as virtue-appropriate (or not).  Monitoring can involve video/audio worn by 
participants – for example, by using the Electronically Activated Recorder (EAR), which is a 
portable audio device that records for specified periods of time (see Handbook Ch. 10) – or 
wired at a particular location, for example, in a dorm room or apartment (see Handbook Chs. 14- 
 
15). Mobile physiological response recording is also possible, though more expensive and 
difficult (see Handbook Chs. 11-13). 
Once again, we run into the issue of “accuracy” – this time in the form of 
“appropriateness.” How do we determine when a response is virtue-appropriate and when it is 
not?  We will have to develop a standard for this, perhaps “paradigmaticity,” as suggested 
earlier, while at the same time being sensitive to the fact we should expect people high in virtue 
intelligence to recognize and responses that may not be widely recognized as virtue-appropriate. 
 
Step 3: Measuring dispositionality 
 
When it comes to measuring virtue intelligence, we are interested in determining its 
“dispositionality” – i.e., the degree to which a person has virtue-appropriate responses in the 
presence of virtue-relevant stimuli across a wide variety of types of situations. The greater the 
degree, the more claim we have to them possessing a global, as opposed to merely local trait. 
Therefore, dispositionality is a critical feature of virtue intelligence to be able to measure. 
We can operationally define “dispositionality” in terms of both consistency and 
habituality. “Consistency” is a matter of the frequency with which a person has virtue- 
appropriate responses in the presence of virtue-relevant stimuli.  It could be measured along two 
distinct dimensions: 1) depth, that is, how frequently people have virtue-appropriate responses to 
the same virtue-relevant stimuli, and 2) breadth, that is, how many different virtue-relevant 
stimuli to which people have virtue-appropriate responses. Together, these measurements 
indicate how “global” the trait can be considered to be. 
“Habituality” is the extent to which the response has become a dynamically automatic 
response to virtue-relevant stimuli.  By this, we mean the skill-based automaticity that develops 
in various forms of expertise. While rapid and largely unconscious, automaticity is also 
appropriately sensitive to the changing virtue-relevant stimuli of the environment.  It allows for 
virtue-appropriate responses to “flow” from the individual without the need for extended 
reflection and cognitive evaluation.  For example, a parent who sees her child fall from a swing
does not need to stop and reflect about whether and how to help. She “automatically,” that is, 
without the need for conscious reflection, goes to the child and offers the aid and comfort she 
deems necessary, perhaps assuaging the child’s fears while tending to a scraped knee. As people 
develop virtue intelligence, this habituality expands to include such automatic, yet appropriate, 
responses to many different people in a wide range of circumstances. (It is important to note that 
just because something is habitual does not mean that it is robust – indeed, many habitual 
behavior is actually quite fragile, vulnerable to interruption/extinction with only slight shifts in 
situational cues. Nonetheless, the habitual system plays a critical part in the development of 
virtue intelligence). 
 
 
4.   Measuring Virtue(s) – Part II: Full-Blown Virtue 
 
When virtue intelligence become linked with the right sort of motivational structure – 
that is, when people become motivated to do the right things for the right reasons – we would 
argue that then virtue intelligence becomes full-blown virtue. We take the “right sort of 
motivational structure” to be the desire to possess, maintain, and develop sensitivity to virtue- 
relevant stimuli and the ability to recognize and generate virtue-appropriate responses for the 
sake of developing and possessing virtue because one believes: 
1) that the virtue itself is valuable and important, and 
 
2) that it is important to be a person who possesses and has the ability to appropriately 
exercise that virtue. 
This involves the measurement of two additional components: first, the chronic 
accessibility of virtue-oriented values/goals – that is, the goal to be, become, or remain a person 
who possesses that virtue; and second, the chronic accessibility of virtue-relevant identity 
attributes – that is, attributes that identify one as a person who actually or ideally possesses and 
can appropriately exercise that virtue. 
The chronic accessibility of virtue-oriented value/goals can be operationally defined as 
the extent to which people explicitly and implicitly identify virtue-oriented values/goals as being 
important values/goals in their lives. For example, as an explicit measurement, people could be 
asked to spontaneously generate a list of their most important values/goals (e.g., to be good 
parent; to volunteer their time at a homeless shelter) and/or to rank a list of values/goals in terms 
of their importance. To get at the same thing implicitly, people could be asked to document their
daily activities and how much time they spend on them, and then these activities can be coded 
for the values/goals reflected by them – the importance of each value/goal being implied by the 
amount of time spent embodying, pursuing, and reflecting upon it (see Frimer and Oaks, 
forthcoming). 
The chronic accessibility of virtue-relevant identity attributes can be operationally 
defined as the extent to which people explicitly and implicitly identify virtue-relevant attributes 
as being central to their actual and/or ideal identities. As an explicit measurement of this, people 
could be asked to spontaneously generate a list of the attributes that are most central to who they 
take themselves to be and/or who they ideally want to be, and/or to rank a list of attributes given 
to them in terms of their centrality to their actual or ideal self-conceptions.  So, for example, 
when asked to describe themselves, we would be interested in whether attributes like “honest,” 
“loyal,” “kind,” etc. show up on their attribute lists. 
This could also be ascertained implicitly by asking people to write about themselves (at 
either a one-time sitting, or on a daily basis for a period of time) and then these descriptions can 
be coded for the attributes reflected in their writing – the centrality of each attribute is implied by 
the frequency with which it shows up in self-descriptions. People could also be asked to write 
about how they would ideally like to be, in order to assess not only those attributes central to 
their current self-conception, but those central to the conception of themselves they are striving 
to achieve. 
In all the above examples, the “chronic accessibility” can be determined by the order 
 
(those reported early in the list being more chronically accessible than those reported later) 
 
and/or the speed (those reported the fastest being more chronically accessible than those reported 
more slowly) with which virtue-oriented goals/values and virtue-relevant attributes are identified 
and/or rated. For example, while two individuals might both list “honest” or “generous” as 
attributes of their identity, if they show up at the top of the list for one person (coming to mind 
quickly when asked to reflect on she would describe herself) and close to the bottom of the list 
for the other (following a host of non-virtue attributes like “funny” or “intelligent”), then we 
would conclude that these virtues are more chronically accessible for the former person than the 
latter (see Handbook Ch. 29).
5.   Final thoughts 
 
I hope that the above discussion has provided some food for thought about the challenges 
associated with the empirical measure of virtue(s) and some strategies for overcoming them. The 
first step is to provide an operational definition of virtue(s) that gives us empirical “traction”. 
The definition given here is an attempt to do just that. The second step is to then identify/ 
generate the empirical tools needed to measure the variables identified by your operational 
definition. 
As I hope has been made clear, the measurement of virtue (however you define it) is not 
going to be a simple project. To adequately assess the development and maintenance of virtue 
(whether virtue intelligence or full-blown virtue), a multi-pronged, interdisciplinary approach – 
one that employs a variety of methodological techniques to collect different types of data from 
different sources – will be necessary. Luckily, many such techniques have already been 
developed to study other related psychological constructs (such as personality) and new ones are 
always being created. Thus, a robust empirical program on virtue is possible – it’s just a matter 
of taking advantage of what is already available, putting our heads together, and getting creative! 
 
I look forward to hearing your thoughts about the efficacy and viability of this approach. 
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